VP.net (short for Verified Privacy) positions itself as a different kind of VPN — one that doesn’t rely on “trust” or audits but on hardware-enforced separation between user identity and traffic(A new VPN, VP.net)., uses Intel SGX secure enclaves so even the provider technically can’t link you to your traffic.(New VP.net). Using Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) secure enclaves and public attestation, VP.net claims it is technically impossible for the operator to link a customer’s identity to their browsing activity — a radical shift in how VPN no-logs promises are implemented.
What VP.net does differently
Traditional VPNs typically promise “no-logs” via policy statements and third-party audits. VP.net’s selling point is hardware-enforced isolation: the service runs connection-handling code inside Intel SGX enclaves so the unencrypted mapping between a user and destination is never available to the host OS, administrators, or the VPN operator. In simple terms, the operator can’t read the routing data because it never exists in the operator’s observable memory space. VP.net also publishes technical documentation and released SGX backend code to allow independent verification.
VP.net’s public materials and press coverage note features familiar to modern VPN users — WireGuard support, cross-platform clients, kill switch and DNS leak protection — but anchored to a “cryptographically verifiable privacy” model that adds remote attestation and open code as proof.
Evidence & verification: open code and attestation
One important differentiator is that VP.net released code for the SGX enclave on GitHub, making independent inspection possible and supporting the company’s claim that users can “verify rather than trust.” That transparency enables researchers and auditors to check that the actual enclave binary corresponds to the published source and to validate remote attestation transcripts. In practice, this approach increases accountability compared to closed-source server stacks.
Limitations & expert caution
While SGX-backed designs raise the bar, experts urge caution. Intel SGX has had a history of side-channel vulnerabilities and practical limitations — including enclave memory size constraints and past speculative-execution style attacks — which means SGX-based guarantees are strong but not absolute. Security is as much about implementation details, update practices, and threat models as it is about the underlying technology. Tech reporters and security researchers have noted both the promise and the potential risks of anchoring privacy entirely to SGX.
How this compares to other “no-log” assurances
Policy + audit VPNs: Many market leaders rely on independent audits, legal jurisdiction choices, and RAM-only servers. Those measures depend on trust in auditors and providers’ operational honesty.
RAM-only / diskless servers: This reduces persistent logging risk but still requires trust that operators cannot correlate identity in memory before reboot.
SGX / attestation model (VP.net): Technically separates identity from activity and publishes verification artifacts, reducing reliance on trust and auditors — provided the enclave implementation and Intel’s SGX remain secure.
Practical advice for users
If you’re evaluating VP.net or other SGX-based offerings:
Inspect independent reviews and community analysis (security blogs, GitHub comments, independent audits).
Verify the vendor’s attestation UI and confirm the enclave identity matches published code.
Consider threat model: SGX helps protect against many server-side threats but does not replace endpoint security or defend against all nation-level actors.
Conclusion
VP.net’s SGX-backed approach is an important innovation in the VPN space: it converts an often-faith-based promise into something users can technically verify. That makes VP.net a noteworthy experiment in “trustless” privacy design — and a useful option for users who want stronger, evidence-based assurances. However, it’s not a silver bullet: SGX has limits and past vulnerabilities, and real-world privacy depends on secure implementation, rapid patching, and transparent operations. For privacy-conscious users, VP.net is worth watching — and, where possible, independently verifying — as the VPN industry evolves beyond mere policy toward attested, hardware-enforced privacy.
Sources & verification
VP.net official technical pages and blog (SGX / no-logs claims). (vp.net)
TechRadar coverage and analysis of VP.net and SGX approach. (TechRadar)
Tom’s Guide article explaining VP.net’s SGX architecture and industry context. (Tom’s Guide)
VP.net GitHub repository (SGX enclave source). (GitHub)
VP.net Google Play listing (feature list for clients). (Google Play)
